On Political Deception
By. Richard Baek
written in sophomore year
It is fascinating to observe how philosophers often have starkly contrasting views on the justness of political deception. Whereas Plato and Machiavelli staunchly endorsed political deception as a means to promote public well-being, Immanuel Kant was vehemently opposed to any and all chicanery in the political realm, arguing that lying itself is categorically incorrect. Personally, I fundamentally agree with Kant about prohibiting the use of political deception. Deceptive practices genuinely weaken the bond of trust between the government and the people, and their frequent use spreads such practices among ill-motivated politicians, thereby threatening our democratic ideals. Thus, regardless of their benefits, political lies must be prohibited.
Think about how politicians consider deception. Don’t they overestimate the likelihood that some benefit will result from their untruthful action and that its harm will be averted? Not only that, don’t they also underestimate the negative impact that their lies, if divulged, might have on the public trust? This is a cataclysmic self-justification that provides a vain motive for countless political deceptions that are disguised as ‘requirements’ for the public good. Hence, lying in the political realm will begin to appear as a matter-of-course, rather than as the last and the worst option which must emerge after all the other plausible options are exhausted.
But I do understand that there are some dire situations in which lies may appear excusable—wars, national crises, or natural disasters. Yet, even in such circumstances, people always want to know the truth. If the government lies to them, they will feel betrayed as to lose their faith in the public officials. This loss of faith is significant because elected officials facing this increasingly skeptical attitude of the public may ask themselves a dangerous question: “if constituencies already have lost their faith in us, why should we even care about keeping the campaign promises after winning the election?” Once this kind of attitude becomes a norm, the already-heightened distrust between people and their government will get worse, and this sequence of prevarication and skepticism will eventually form a vicious cycle that is capable of corrupting the entire political system.
Despite these latent detriments of political deception, the Democratic Machiavellians—people like David Shugarman and Sissela Bok, who allow for the use of deception only when the public interest is obviously at stake—still argue that there are two considerable benefits that come along with the use of political deceptions. Their first point is that deceptive practices in politics are conducive to the maintenance of public safety. They perceive national security as a precondition to the public trust, since safety of the public is a more basic good than the trust between government and the people. Thus, if it is likely that public’s knowing certain information may result in domestic instability, the representatives are permitted to hide truth from the public. Their second argument is that political lies preclude unnecessary debates between citizens, and thus enhancing the efficiency of governmental procedures. However, these are only ephemeral gains; the Democratic Machiavellians are seriously overlooking the long-term side-effects of political deceptions.
First and foremost, trust and safety are two mutually dependent factors. A lack of trust makes people doubt their representatives as unreliable sources of information, and they will start to follow their own intuitions and neglect the decisions—or laws—made by the government. Consequently, the people will cease to live up to the expectations of the government, and this will make it difficult for them to collaborate with their leaders even when the cooperation is urgently needed: an enemy invasion, financial crises, or any type of national emergencies. Clearly, this failure of collaboration ultimately threatens public security. Indeed, domestic security is necessary to foster the trust between the national government and its people. However, just as much as security is an essential ingredient for the maintenance of trust, so is trust an indispensable condition for the survival of the domestic security. Therefore, my opponent’s argument about security being a precondition for public trust is hardly plausible.
The Democratic Machiavellians also argue that some well-motivated politicians use deceptions to prevent a nationwide panic. To begin with, I acknowledge the fact that there have been several cases in history in which political lies obviated violent anti-war protests and panics in the street. For instance, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reassured Americans that their soldiers would not fight on foreign soil, although he had known that the United States would eventually fight in World War II. Similarly, President Kennedy, amidst the Cuban Missile Crisis, conveyed a message to Americans that the government was not planning on any military intervention on Cuban soil. Although these lies were used to placate volatile national sentiment, we must not forget that there had also been a series of unpardonable duplicities in the Nixon Administration.
A watershed event that revealed the libertine acts of the Nixon Administration, was the Watergate Scandal. In 1972, when Nixon lied about his involvement in wiretapping the National Democratic Headquarters, he jettisoned the most fundamental duty of elected officials—to strive for the good of public—for the protection of his personal interest. Thus, although deception may seem like a useful alternative in handling a national crisis, in the long run, it may set a precedent for an ill-motivated politician like Nixon to compromise the good of the public for a personal gain.
Finally, allowing political lies for the sake of efficiency compromises democratic values. If public officials can distort the truth for the sake of efficiency, the people will no longer have access to reliable information. As a result, the people, regardless of the veracity of information, will rely on whatever their government tells them, and lose their ability to express their opinions properly. Not only that, the “elites” who possess professional responsibilities that set them apart from the commoners will monopolize the truth, breaking equality among the citizens. If a group of people in a society possesses legally unjustified advantages over others, the society is no longer democratic. This unequal treatment of citizens signifies a departure from the fundamental values of democracy and a step toward a suppressive regime in which average citizens are not able to fully express their opinions. By withholding the truth from its people, a nation will eventually be able to make decisions more quickly and pass legislations much more effectively than when such processes involve a direct participation of citizens. Yet, the notion that secrecy, law-breaking, and covert violence are necessary to promote the principles and the project of democracy, in the words of C.A.J. Coady, is corrosive to the basic ideals of democracy.
Despite these detriments of political deception, Machiavelli and his fellow philosophers still argue that although it is in principle admirable for a ruler to acquire prior consent before he deceives the public, it is in practice more useful to open a little room for some non-consensual lies that are done in emergency situations. But, political lies have some unimaginably harmful influences in society: the loss of public trust, a normalization of deceptive practices in the political realm, and an eventual corrosion of democratic values. All these drawbacks of political deception not only offset, but also outweigh its prospective benefits.
Think about how politicians consider deception. Don’t they overestimate the likelihood that some benefit will result from their untruthful action and that its harm will be averted? Not only that, don’t they also underestimate the negative impact that their lies, if divulged, might have on the public trust? This is a cataclysmic self-justification that provides a vain motive for countless political deceptions that are disguised as ‘requirements’ for the public good. Hence, lying in the political realm will begin to appear as a matter-of-course, rather than as the last and the worst option which must emerge after all the other plausible options are exhausted.
But I do understand that there are some dire situations in which lies may appear excusable—wars, national crises, or natural disasters. Yet, even in such circumstances, people always want to know the truth. If the government lies to them, they will feel betrayed as to lose their faith in the public officials. This loss of faith is significant because elected officials facing this increasingly skeptical attitude of the public may ask themselves a dangerous question: “if constituencies already have lost their faith in us, why should we even care about keeping the campaign promises after winning the election?” Once this kind of attitude becomes a norm, the already-heightened distrust between people and their government will get worse, and this sequence of prevarication and skepticism will eventually form a vicious cycle that is capable of corrupting the entire political system.
Despite these latent detriments of political deception, the Democratic Machiavellians—people like David Shugarman and Sissela Bok, who allow for the use of deception only when the public interest is obviously at stake—still argue that there are two considerable benefits that come along with the use of political deceptions. Their first point is that deceptive practices in politics are conducive to the maintenance of public safety. They perceive national security as a precondition to the public trust, since safety of the public is a more basic good than the trust between government and the people. Thus, if it is likely that public’s knowing certain information may result in domestic instability, the representatives are permitted to hide truth from the public. Their second argument is that political lies preclude unnecessary debates between citizens, and thus enhancing the efficiency of governmental procedures. However, these are only ephemeral gains; the Democratic Machiavellians are seriously overlooking the long-term side-effects of political deceptions.
First and foremost, trust and safety are two mutually dependent factors. A lack of trust makes people doubt their representatives as unreliable sources of information, and they will start to follow their own intuitions and neglect the decisions—or laws—made by the government. Consequently, the people will cease to live up to the expectations of the government, and this will make it difficult for them to collaborate with their leaders even when the cooperation is urgently needed: an enemy invasion, financial crises, or any type of national emergencies. Clearly, this failure of collaboration ultimately threatens public security. Indeed, domestic security is necessary to foster the trust between the national government and its people. However, just as much as security is an essential ingredient for the maintenance of trust, so is trust an indispensable condition for the survival of the domestic security. Therefore, my opponent’s argument about security being a precondition for public trust is hardly plausible.
The Democratic Machiavellians also argue that some well-motivated politicians use deceptions to prevent a nationwide panic. To begin with, I acknowledge the fact that there have been several cases in history in which political lies obviated violent anti-war protests and panics in the street. For instance, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reassured Americans that their soldiers would not fight on foreign soil, although he had known that the United States would eventually fight in World War II. Similarly, President Kennedy, amidst the Cuban Missile Crisis, conveyed a message to Americans that the government was not planning on any military intervention on Cuban soil. Although these lies were used to placate volatile national sentiment, we must not forget that there had also been a series of unpardonable duplicities in the Nixon Administration.
A watershed event that revealed the libertine acts of the Nixon Administration, was the Watergate Scandal. In 1972, when Nixon lied about his involvement in wiretapping the National Democratic Headquarters, he jettisoned the most fundamental duty of elected officials—to strive for the good of public—for the protection of his personal interest. Thus, although deception may seem like a useful alternative in handling a national crisis, in the long run, it may set a precedent for an ill-motivated politician like Nixon to compromise the good of the public for a personal gain.
Finally, allowing political lies for the sake of efficiency compromises democratic values. If public officials can distort the truth for the sake of efficiency, the people will no longer have access to reliable information. As a result, the people, regardless of the veracity of information, will rely on whatever their government tells them, and lose their ability to express their opinions properly. Not only that, the “elites” who possess professional responsibilities that set them apart from the commoners will monopolize the truth, breaking equality among the citizens. If a group of people in a society possesses legally unjustified advantages over others, the society is no longer democratic. This unequal treatment of citizens signifies a departure from the fundamental values of democracy and a step toward a suppressive regime in which average citizens are not able to fully express their opinions. By withholding the truth from its people, a nation will eventually be able to make decisions more quickly and pass legislations much more effectively than when such processes involve a direct participation of citizens. Yet, the notion that secrecy, law-breaking, and covert violence are necessary to promote the principles and the project of democracy, in the words of C.A.J. Coady, is corrosive to the basic ideals of democracy.
Despite these detriments of political deception, Machiavelli and his fellow philosophers still argue that although it is in principle admirable for a ruler to acquire prior consent before he deceives the public, it is in practice more useful to open a little room for some non-consensual lies that are done in emergency situations. But, political lies have some unimaginably harmful influences in society: the loss of public trust, a normalization of deceptive practices in the political realm, and an eventual corrosion of democratic values. All these drawbacks of political deception not only offset, but also outweigh its prospective benefits.